CHINA AND AMERICA NEED NOT BE ENERGY RIVALS

 
Daniel Yergin
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
 
 
Energy is markedly different from the other controversial matters that will be at the top of the US-Chinese Strategic Economic Dialogue, edition two, meeting this week in Washington. Trade and currencies are the now familiar issues at the centre of the economic tensions in the bilateral relationship. Energy, however, is about competition and the risks of collision around the world. At a time of tight markets and high prices, those risks can grow.

The dialogue is chaired by Henry Paulson, the US treasury secretary, who has the lead on China issues in the US government, and Wu Yi, China's vice-premier. It is meant to provide a framework for defusing controversies and reducing the stresses in the rapidly changing relationship. The need is certainly there when it comes to energy – both to ensure that commercial competition does not turn into geostrategic rivalry, and to respond to the major environmental challenges.

For some, it is too late. In their view, the rivalry risk is already here. They see a mercantilist China single-mindedly moving to pre-empt world oil supplies. Some Chinese, for their part, fear their country being denied access to supplies and worry about the vulnerability of its lengthening supply lines.

The reality is more complex. China's demand, while less than 10 per cent of the world total, is increasing quickly because of rapid economic growth. Its oil market is now the second largest in the world – 40 per cent larger than Japan's – and it has gone in less than 15 years from self sufficiency to importing half its total supply.

Thus, it is not surprising that China – with a strong domestic industry on which to base a “go out” strategy – would seek to acquire and develop production assets around the world. It would be more surprising were it not to do so. For consumers in North America and Europe, it is actually much better, at a time of growing demand, that China is investing to bring additional barrels to market than not.

But perspective is required on two key points. The first is scale. For all the discussion about China's activities, its total production outside its borders is a fraction of that of just one of the supermajors. The second is to understand the significance – and urgency – of energy security for the Chinese. For Beijing, it means ensuring that there is sufficient energy to fuel the economic growth needed for social stability and for absorbing almost 20m migrants a year into urban areas.

The real risks are not from competition in the global marketplace. Rather they would arise when oil and gas development gets caught up in larger foreign policy issues, of which those involving Iran and Sudan are currently the most obvious. What the dialogue can do is emphasise the very large common interests the two countries share as the world's two largest petroleum consumers. The US imports 60 per cent of its oil; China 50 per cent. Between them, they account for almost 35 per cent of world consumption. Both benefit from stable markets, open to trade and investment. Here, the dialogue can help build China's confidence in the reliability of the global market and the institutions maintaining its security. Of course, this is more challenging when anxiety about supplies and prices is so high.

China is just beginning to fill its new strategic petroleum reserve. One key question now is to develop some congruence on the purpose and management of such a reserve – and on how to co-ordinate during a major disruption.

Coal is another common interest for the US and China. They are, respectively, holders of the largest and second-largest coal reserves in the world. Half of America's electricity is generated from coal, and three-quarters of China's. This inevitably means that clean coal and carbon sequestration loom large on any bilateral energy agenda.

One of the most fruitful subjects is on the demand side. The emphasis around the world on energy efficiency has not been seen for decades – indeed, if ever before. It now has strong support across the US political spectrum. For its part, Beijing, contemplating a fourfold growth in its economy by 2020, has put conservation among its top priorities and is trying to shift to less energy-intensive expansion. It is not easy to do so in an economy that is swelling so fast that it has to add one or two new power plants a week. On a global basis, climate change is the new driving force for energy efficiency – as less energy usage is the biggest near-term mechanism for reducing emissions. That imperative will grow stronger. For China, there is also the immediate imperative – the all-too-evident local and regional air pollution, with direct impacts on health.

One specific “deliverable” that could emerge from the dialogue would be the removal of tariffs and barriers on trade in technology and equipment for energy efficiency and renewables. That could also become part of a broader dialogue on the knowhow for reducing energy intensity and implementing such efficiency quickly. With the way that policies and public opinion are going, that could mean building a permanent agenda out of a twice-yearly dialogue. The benefits would accrue to both countries and, at the same time, would be shared worldwide.

The writer is chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, an IHS company, and the author of The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power and of The Commanding Heights. He is writing a new book on energy and geopolitics

中美不必成为能源竞争对手

 
作者：剑桥能源研究协会丹尼尔•尤金(Daniel Yergin)
2007年5月22日 星期二
 
 
在本周即将于华盛顿举行的美中第二轮战略经济对话中，能源问题显然不同于会议议程上其它具有争议的重要问题。目前，贸易和汇率已经是导致美中双边经济关系紧张的常见核心问题。然而，能源问题涉及全球竞争和冲突风险。在当前供应紧缺、油价高企的形势下，这些风险还可能进一步加剧。

本轮美中战略经济对话将由美国财长汉克•保尔森(Hank Paulson)和中国国务院副总理吴仪主持。在美国政府中，保尔森在中国问题上担当着主要角色。此次对话的目的在于，为迅速变化的美中关系制定一个消除争论和减轻压力的框架。从能源角度而言，这一对话当然也是必要的——既要确保商业竞争不演变为地缘敌对，也需要对重大的环境挑战做出回应。

对一些人而言，美中经济对话为时已晚。在他们看来，敌对风险已经产生。他们看到，具有重商主义倾向的中国正在一门心思地抢占世界石油供应。对一些中国人而言，他们担心其国家无法获得能源供应，同时不断拉长的能源供应链易受到攻击。

现实情况更加复杂。虽然中国的能源需求不足世界需求的10%，但由于经济增长迅速，它的需求正在快速增长。目前，中国是世界第二大石油市场，规模较日本高出40%。在不到15年的时间里，中国已经从一个石油自给自足的国家，转变为一个全部供应的半数需要进口的国家。

因此，中国寻求在全世界范围内收购和开发能源资产也就不令人惊讶了。中国拥有强大的国内产业，能够支撑其“走出去”战略。如果中国不这样做，人们反倒会更加惊讶。对北美和欧洲的消费者而言，在当前能源需求日益增长的形势下，中国进行投资以增加原油市场供应的做法，实际上要比不这样做好得多。

但有两个关键问题需要深入分析。首先是规模。尽管人们都在谈论中国的海外能源战略，但其境外生产总量仅仅是任何一家大型石油公司的零头。其次是理解能源安全对中国的重要意义和迫切性。对中国政府而言，这意味着确保有充足的能源支撑经济增长，而经济增长是确保社会稳定和城市每年吸纳2000万农民工所必需的。

真正的风险并非来自全球市场上的竞争，而是当油气开发受阻于更广泛的外交政策问题（这一点伊朗和苏丹最明显不过）时，风险才会出现。美中经济对话的作用在于，强调两国作为全球最大两个石油消费国的共同巨大利益。美国有60%的石油依赖进口，而中国为50%。两国占世界石油消费总量的近35%。如果市场稳定，双方对贸易和投资持开放态度，两国都能从中获益。美中经济对话能够帮助中国建立起对全球市场可靠性及其安全维持机制的信心。诚然，当人们对原油供应和油价的担忧如此强烈时，要做到这一点更具挑战性。

中国才刚刚开始进行战略石油储备。现在一个关键的问题是，中美要对这种储备的意图及管理，以及在石油供应严重中断的情况下如何协调一致，达成某种程度的共识。

煤炭是美中之间的另一个共同利益。它们分别是全球煤炭储量第一和第二大国。美国一半的电力来自燃煤电厂，中国的比例为四分之三。这不可避免地意味着，在中美有关能源的任何双边议程中，洁净煤和碳封存议题占据高位。

最有成效的主题之一是在需求方面。目前全球对能源效率的重视，是过去数十年未见，甚至是前所未有的。如今提高能源效率已受到美国朝野各界的支持。预期到2020年将实现经济增长翻两番的中国，已将保护自然资源列为优先事项之一，正试图向能源密集程度较低的扩张方式转型。在一个增长如此迅猛的经济体，做到这一点并不容易——在中国，每一周都必须增加一家或两家新的发电厂。在全球层面，因为少使用能源是减少碳排放的近期最有效机制，气候变化已成为提高能效的新推动力量，这种力量的必要性将变得更大。对中国来说，同样存在刻不容缓的迫切性——中国各地的空气污染太明显了，已经对健康造成直接影响。

此次中美对话可能达成的一个具体“成果”将是：取消针对节能和可再生能源技术设备的关税和贸易壁垒。这也可能成为更广范围的知识交流的一部分，旨在降低能源密集度和快速部署能效措施。伴随政策和公众舆论的推进，这类对话可能意味着在中美之间建立一个源自一年两次对话的长效议程。它带来的好处将造福中美两国，同时也有益于全世界。

本文作者是艾曲斯(IHS)公司旗下剑桥能源研究协会(Cambridge Energy Research Associates)主席，著有The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power and of The Commanding Heights一书。目前他正在撰写另一部有关能源和地缘政治的著作。