The long view on China, political Islam and American power

 
JOSEPH NYE
Wednesday, March 07, 2007
 
 
Iraq is sucking the oxygen out of any long-term foreign policy discussion, but the US must peer further into the future if it wishes to shape a post-Bush policy.

The National Intelligence Council has published four widely different pictures of the world in 2020: Davos World, in which economic globalisation continues but with a more Asian face; Pax Americana, where the US continues to shape the global order; New Caliphate, where Islamic religious identity challenges the dominance of western norms; and Cycle of Fear, in which non-state forces create shocks to security that produce an Orwellian society.

Which is most likely? Technological change will continue to push globalisation but three factors will shape the political outcome.

First is Chinese power and how it is used. Polls show that a third of Americans believe China will “soon dominate the world”, but despite its remarkable growth, China's income per capita is only a twenty-fifth of that of the US. While it is possible that China's total economy could equal that of the US in 30 years or so, American per capita income is likely still to be four times that of China. This is not like a century ago when a rising Germany surpassed Britain in industrial strength by 1900.

The big question for China will be its internal evolution. It has lifted 400m people out of poverty since 1990 but another 400m live on less than $2 per day. Unlike India, China has not solved the problem of political participation. If China turns to nationalism as a social glue to replace its eroded communism, it could lead to a more aggressive foreign policy. Or it may deal with its problems and become what the Bush administration calls a “responsible stakeholder” in world politics.

Political Islam and how it develops will be the second factor. The struggle against extreme Islamist terrorism is not a “clash of civilisations” but a civil war within Islam. A radical minority is using violence to impose a simplified and ideological version on a mainstream with more diverse views. While the largest number of Muslims live in Asia, they are influenced by the heart of this struggle in the Middle East, an area that has lagged behind the rest of the world in globalisation, openness, institutions and democratisation.

More open trade, economic growth, education, development of civil society institutions and gradual increases in political participation might help strengthen the mainstream over time, but so could the way Muslims are treat-ed in Europe and the US. Equally imp-ortant will be whether western policies towards the Middle East satisfy mainstream Muslims or reinforce the radicals' narrative of a war against Islam.

The third determinant will be American power and how it is used. The US will remain the most powerful country in 2020, but the paradox is that the strongest state since Rome will not be able to protect its citizens acting alone. The US's military might is not adequate to deal with threats such as global pandemics, climate change, terrorism and international crime. These issues require co-operation and the soft power of attracting support. Defeating Islamist terrorism, for example, requires international intelligence and police co-operation, as well as drying up the sources of radical recruits.

While hard military power will remain crucial for deterrence, alliances and stability, if we use it in the wrong way, we will undercut the soft power we need to win. Thus far, intelligence reports that US policies have created more new terrorists than they have destroyed. One of the determinants of the future will be whether the US recovers the ability it once had in the cold war to combine hard and soft power into smart power.

If these three forces move in a favourable direction, the most likely world will be a relatively optimistic combination of globalisation with a more Asian face plus Pax Americana.

Events, however, could derail this possible future. My top candidates include: political instability in China that creates a prolonged slump, violence and a more aggressive foreign policy; a conflict or revolutions in the Gulf that disrupt access of the world economy to the region that holds two-thirds of oil reserves; a pandemic that produces widespread deaths, economic dislocation and closure of borders; acts of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction that lead not only to millions of deaths, but to our imposing self-destructive restrictions and loss of liberties at home; climate change that occurs more quickly than expected or a catastrophic event such as the collapse of the Antarctic ice shelf.

There are other candidates. I assume that HIV-Aids will continue to cause untold suffering, particularly in Africa, but will not change relations among the great powers. I may be wrong. I have also assumed that demographic decline in Europe, Russia and Japan, as well as differences in their interests, will prevent their individual rise to superpower status or the creation of an alliance to balance US power.

The point is not whether my guesses are correct, but that policy debates should focus more on developing a longer-term vision. We are making choices that affect those futures every day, and it is important to educate our guesses: 2020 is not that far away.

The writer teaches at Harvard in the Kennedy School of Government's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and is the author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics

2020年的世界

 
美国哈佛大学教授约瑟夫·奈(JOSEPH NYE)为英国《金融时报》撰稿
2007年3月7日 星期三
 
 
伊拉克正“吮吸着”每一次长期外交政策讨论带来的“氧气”，但如果美国希望制定一个“后布什”(post-Bush)时期的外交政策，那么它就必须看得更远一些。

美国国家情报委员会(National Intelligence Council)公开描绘了2020年世界的4种迥异图景：“达沃斯世界”(Davos World)——经济全球化仍在继续，但亚洲面孔会出现得更多；“美国主导的和平”(Pax Americana) ——美国会继续塑造国际秩序；“新伊斯兰世界”(New Caliphate) ——伊斯兰宗教教义将挑战西方社会准则的主导地位；“恐惧周期”(Cycle of Fear) ——非国家力量带来的安全冲击，将导致因失去人性的极权社会。

哪种情况最可能发生？科技变革将继续推进全球化的发展，但有3个因素将决定政治结果。

首先是中国的实力以及它的使用方式。民意调查显示，三分之一的美国人认为，中国“很快就将主宰世界”，但尽管中国的经济增长引人注目，但其人均收入仍只有美国的四分之一。虽然在未来30年左右的时间里，中国的总体经济水平可能与美国持平，但美国的人均收入水平仍可能是中国的4倍。这与一个世纪前的情况有所不同：到1900年，崛起的德国在工业实力方面一举超过了英国。

对中国而言，重要的问题乃是其自身的发展。自1990年以来，中国已使4亿人口脱离了贫困，但还有4亿人口每天的生活费用不足2美元。与印度不同，中国还未解决政治参与的问题。如果中国以民族主义作为社会粘合剂，来取代被减弱的共产主义，那么它就可能形成一种更好斗的外交政策；或者，它也可能会处理好自己的问题，并在世界政治中成为布什政府所谓的“负责任的利益相关者”。

“政治伊斯兰”及其发展方式，将构成第二个因素。反抗极端伊斯兰恐怖主义的斗争，并不是一场“文明的冲突”，而是伊斯兰世界的一场内战。激进的少数伊斯兰群体正利用暴力，把一种简单化的意识形态强加给拥有更多不同观点的主流人群。虽然绝大多数穆斯林生活在亚洲，但他们受到了来自斗争核心中东的影响。而在全球化、开放性、社会制度和民主化方面，中东都已落后于世界其它地区。

随着时间的推移，更多的开放贸易、经济增长、教育、公民社会制度的发展，以及政治参与程度的逐渐提高，可能会有助于增强穆斯林主流的实力，但欧美对待其穆斯林族群的方式也同样能产生影响。同样重要的是，西方国家的中东政策是能令主流穆斯林满意，还是会强化激进分子针对伊斯兰教的战争言论？

第三个决定性因素，是美国的实力以及它的使用方式。到2020年美国仍将是最强大的国家，但问题是，自罗马帝国以来，即使是最强大的国家也不能靠单独行动来保护其公民了。美国的军队可能不足以应付全球性传染病、气候变化、恐怖主义和国际犯罪等威胁。这些问题需要合作，以及吸引支持力量的软实力。例如，打击伊斯兰恐怖主义，需要国际情报和警力合作，同时还要断绝激进势力招募新兵的来源。

虽然强大的军事力量对于威慑、联盟和稳定仍至关重要，但如果用错了地方，就会削弱赢得胜利所需的软实力。迄今为止，有情报显示，因美国政策而涌现的新恐怖主义分子，要多于其消灭的恐怖主义分子。关于未来的决定性因素之一，将是美国能否恢复其曾经在冷战中拥有的能力：将硬实力和软实力结合起来，变成某种巧妙的力量。

如果这三股力量都朝着良好的方向发展，那么最有可能出现的世界将是相对乐观的结合，即有着更多亚洲面孔的全球化，再加上“美国主导的和平”。

然而，一些事件会使这种可能偏离原来的轨道。以我所见，最主要事件将包括：中国的政治不稳定性，这会导致该国出现长期的经济衰退、暴乱和一种更好斗的外交政策；海湾地区的冲突或革命，这会把这个拥有全球三分之二石油储量的地区隔绝在世界经济之外；一场传染病的爆发，这会导致人类大量死亡、经济混乱和边界关闭；使用大规模杀伤性武器的恐怖主义行动，这不仅会导致数百万人死亡，还会导致令人恐惧的、自我毁灭性限制，并且丧失在本国享有的自由；快于预期的气候变化或南极冰山融化等灾难性事件。

还有其它因素。我猜想艾滋病将继续造成无数苦难，特别是在非洲，但这不会改变大国之间的关系。可能我是错的。我还猜想欧洲、俄罗斯和日本的人口下降，以及它们在利益上的分歧，将使它们各自都不能崛起为超级大国，也不能结成联盟来抗衡美国的实力。

关键问题并不在于我的猜想是否正确，而是政策争论应更多关注于形成一种更长期的远见。我们正在做出影响未来每一天的决定，重要的是，在猜想时我们必须明白：2020年并不遥远。

本文作者在哈佛大学(Harvard)肯尼迪政府学院(Kennedy School of Government)的贝尔弗尔科学与国际事务研究中心(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs)任教，《软实力：世界政治中的成功之道》(Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics)一书的作者。