RISING POPULATIONS BREED RISING POWERS
NEIL HOWE and RICHARD JACKSON
Wednesday, February 14, 2007
Three decades ago, a population explosion was deemed to be humanity's greatest threat. Today, our worries have turned around: the prospect of a population implosion haunts our future.
The developed world's population is on track to decline steadily from 2025 onwards, according to United Nations' projections. Excluding the US, the decline has already begun. Japan, Europe and Russia could lose between one-half and two-thirds of their population by 2100. Even some large developing countries are due to see a decline: China after 2030 and Mexico after 2050.
As leaders ponder this prospect – and wade into nasty debates about pension cuts, incentives to have children and immigration expansion – some experts tell us not to worry. They say fewer people may be a blessing: growth in living standards will continue while congestion and pressure on the environment will be eased. We believe, to the contrary, that population decline will pose massive fiscal, economic and geopolitical challenges that leaders have hardly begun to grasp.
Let us start with the fiscal challenge. Because population decline is driven by falling fertility rates – and because life expectancy meanwhile is rising – countries projected to have shrinking populations are also projected to experience a rapid rise in the ratio of old to young. By the year 2050, at current fertility rates, Japan and most of the nations of Europe will have a median age of much more than 50 – which means as much as two-thirds of the adult population would then be eligible for public pensions under today's rules. Add the impact of ageing on healthcare expenditures and the extra public cost could easily exceed 10 per cent of gross domestic product in most countries.
Governments will be forced to choose between economically ruinous tax rises and politically impossible benefit cuts. Either that, or they will have to slash other budget areas (such as education, infrastructure and defence) or run large fiscal deficits (and undermine national savings) to make ends meet.
The fiscal impact aside, population decline may also, in fact, undermine growth in living standards. Smaller societies are less able to benefit from economies of scale. A shrinking labour force also requires less annual investment, which in turn limits opportunities for technological innovation; what some economists call “learning by doing”. Such economies, having less need for capital expansion, will tend to accumulate an ageing stock of physical capital. With each birth cohort smaller than the last, they will also acquire an ageing stock of human capital – possibly lacking the creative and entrepreneurial drive associated with youth.
Consider what it will feel like to live in an economy in which real GDP is experiencing little or no long-term growth. By the 2020s, this will be the case in Japan and much of Europe, where workforces will be shrinking about as fast as productivity will be growing. The impact may be profound. History shows that societies often react defensively to a stagnating economy, favouring cartels, beggar-thy-neighbour protectionism and anti-immigrant populism. Just think of the 1930s.
Finally, there is the geopolitical challenge. When it comes to security and global influence, size matters. It makes a difference to your future whether you live in China or Taiwan. It also makes a difference whether your nation expects to be much larger 50 years from now (such as India) or much smaller (such as Russia). As important as absolute size is the rate of growth or decline over time. Demographic growth is not a sufficient condition for power or prosperity. Many societies have populated their way to ruin. But it does seem to be a necessary condition for the long-term success of nations.
The record is clear: virtually every rising power in history has also been a demographically expanding power. That is true for entire civilisations and also for individual states in their era of most rapid ascendance, as attested by the history of Venice, Portugal, the UK, Germany and the US, among others. By contrast, there has been no rising power that has simultaneously experienced demographic decline.
In rising powers, higher fertility rates go hand in hand with greater faith in collective destiny. Feeling optimism about the future, families have more children. These children in turn reinforce adults' focus on posterity. Children and the future make a virtuous circle – a lesson that the developed world would do well to ponder as it looks to the coming century.
Neil Howe is a senior adviser and Richard Jackson a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington