瑞星卡卡安全论坛综合娱乐区Rising茶馆 【推荐】猪肉是个大问题

1   1  /  1  页   跳转

【推荐】猪肉是个大问题

【推荐】猪肉是个大问题

Raid on a piggy bank

 
Richard McGregor
Saturday, September 29, 2007
 
 
Inany other country, a shortage of pigs might be brushed off as a temporary phenomenon, cured by another turn in the perennial “hog cycle” as rising prices prompt higher meat production.

But in China, where pork is the staple meat and food counts for a large part of the household budget, the shortage – and its feared spillover to other parts of the economy – is being treated as something approaching a national emergency.

The spectre of inflation fomenting broader discontent – as it did two decades ago, culminating in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 – taps into the deepest existential fears of Chinese rulers about mass disorder and regime survival. In recent weeks, protests by students angry at higher prices and smaller food servings in their canteens have been reported in Anhui and Guangdong provinces. Even in affluent urban centres, including Beijing and Shanghai, the food price rises are causing resentment.

Inflation hit 6.5 per cent in August, the highest rate in 11 years, largely because of a 49 per cent year-on-year surge in meat and poultry prices (see chart). The fact that non-food price gains have remained low, at less than 1 per cent, has not calmed the nerves of senior policymakers.

“We have entered a very delicate stage of our development,” says a senior economist and government adviser, asking not to be named. “For a long time, I was very optimistic about China's growth, but now I am quite worried. Real inflation is much higher. No one believes the government's figures.”

Inflation has lowered the attractiveness of bank savings, which pay only 3.87 per cent interest on a one-year deposit account. If negative real interest rates persist, policymakers fear depositors could flee the banks and pour more of their money into the already frothy stock and property markets. “Inflation and the asset bubbles are now supporting each other. This is very dangerous,” says the economist.

Two high-profile events on Beijing's calendar have added to the pressure on the government. The five-yearly Communist party congress in mid-October will pick the country's leadership team until 2012 and perhaps anoint a new generation of leaders to take over after that. August 2008, meanwhile, brings the Beijing Olympics, an event on which the government is betting China's reputation.

In the short term, the government has also been rushing out a series of measures, in recent days freezing state-controlled prices and releasing meat from a “strategic pork reserve” as well as offering farmers incentives to raise more pigs and get them to market. Officials are anticipating a surge in demand during week-long National Day holidays that start on October 1 and are a time of family celebrations and banquets.

Albert Keidel of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, a former World Bank economist in China, paints a gloomy scenario about the unfolding crisis, saying “draconian steps to suppress inflation could cause hardship and social unrest”. If there were protests during the Olympics, “vicious reprisals could fill the global media” and severely damage China's standing. “The consequences would hurt just not growth but also China's commercial and political relationship with the US,” he adds.

The shortage of pork is a result of a convergence of factors. Porcine blue-ear disease swept through many farms late last year, killing millions of pigs. Feed costs rose as global corn prices were driven higher by a boom in demand for the crop for use in producing ethanol. Low pig prices in 2006 prompted farmers to raise fewer animals.

Some see this year's resultant shortfall as indeed temporary and say the market is working the problem through. “As prices rose and blue-ear remained under control, farmers earlier this year began rebuilding their hog stocks,” says Andy Rothman, of CLSA, the brokerage, in Shanghai. “Since it takes about four months to raise a hog to slaughter weight, this means supply should begin to catch up with demand in September.” Wholesale pork prices have now declined for six consecutive weeks and are down 11 per cent from their peak.

If this trend is maintained, inflation too will abate, relieving much of the immediate pressure on the government. But if not, broader global concerns about Chinese inflation will grow, with the attendant risk of substantially higher wages and export prices. That, in turn, would mean higher prices for toys, clothing and a host of everyday goods in the Wal-Marts and Carrefours of the US and Europe. It would affect much of the developed world, which has enjoyed low inflation for the last decade partly because of a flood of cheap Chinese goods.

But many are sceptical that the hog cycle can be turned around so quickly. “This is not a blip or a temporary thing. It is a shift,” says James Rice, the China country head for Tyson Foods, in Shanghai. “When you want to increase your capacity [in this industry], it takes a long time.”

Farmers, concerned about their fully-grown pigs catching blue-ear disease, and eager to capture the high market prices, are also slaughtering them younger, meaning that the meat generated per animal is declining. Pigs usually slaughtered at 120kg are now being killed at a weight of about 75kg, says Mr Rice.

Central and provincial governments have responded with a range of measures, offering incentives to farmers to raise more pigs and even cutting road tolls for trucks transporting the animals to market. To great fanfare, the government last week released the equivalent of 30,000 tonnes of live pigs from what it calls its “central meats reserves”, also known as the strategic pork reserve.

This “piggy bank” consists of both live animals and frozen meat, according to the two ministries that manage it, but its size is a state secret. Mr Rice doubts it will have any real impact other than burnishing the government's credentials in tackling the crisis. “They describe it as though they have pigs buried underground, like oil in wells,” he says. “It is not really a true reserve.”

With China consuming about 130,000 tonnes of pork a day, 30,000 tonnes will have little impact in any case. Anecdotal evidence from farmers also suggests that restocking will not be fast.

Li Yongqiang, who has raised pigs on the outskirts of Beijing for 19 years, says the wild price fluctuations for pork are making small farm operators cautious. Mr Li lost nearly half of his 4,000 pigs to blue-ear but says the high prices for the sows he needs to replace them make for a very risky investment. “It will take me about a year to get the new pigs to market, but most farmers have no idea what the price will be then,” he says. “Raising pigs is just like the stock market. If the prices are high, you will sell, but if they are low, you are stuck with them.”

The government's rapid reaction, perhaps even overreaction, to combating price rises is already infecting broader economic policy. The central bank has lifted interest rates five times this year to try to keep prices in check. In recent days, the government has frozen all state-controlled prices, including those for fuel and electricity, in an effort to quarantine the impact of the food increases.

Both moves have potentially damaging consequences for key areas of economic policy. The rate rises will provide an extra incentive for capital inflows, according to economists, at a time when the central bank is already managing the monetary impact of trade surpluses of about $25bn (£12bn, €bn) a month.

China's tightly managed currency is also contributing to inflationary pressures. The central bank's purchase of the incoming cash generated by the trade surpluses, a measure necessary to stop the renminbi from rising, is pushing up domestic liquidity and helping swell property and stock prices.

The freeze on fuel and electricity prices, meanwhile, runs counter to the government's energy policies, which have been predicated on gradual cost increases in order to force lower and more efficient consumption. Chinese leaders, however, will have seen the eruption of street protests in Burma this month in the wake of sudden fuel price increases and will doubtless again resolve to delay a long-awaited reform further into the future.

Such remedies in any case do not tackle the structural nature of food inflation in China, according to Mr Keidel. He says the origins of China's inflationary crises, in 1988-89 and again in 1993-96, lie in the country's enduring “food security” policy and restrictions on imports. Like Japan, China believes that its national security rests on its ability to feed itself.

In pursuit of this policy, farmers who want to switch out of low-profit grain production have in effect been pushed back into those crops by government inducements whenever supplies subside and urban food prices rise. “China's gathering inflationary storm today is not powered by international factors, like trade surpluses or increased foreign reserves,” he says. “It is a domestic storm, blowing in from the country's grain-growing central regions.”

But while the food security policy remains in name, strong domestic food demand and the declining power of government to tell farmers what to do are unravelling it in practice. China's output of fruit, for example, rose from 64m tonnes to 161m tonnes between 1999 and 2005, according to analysts at JPMorgan, while the proportion of land devoted to grain production fell from 72 per cent to 67 per cent.

The Communist party will not have forgotten that its rise to power in 1949 was substantially helped by the catastrophic inflation that helped destroy the credibility of its Nationalist rivals. The party's first years in power were devoted to taming the inflation beast.

Against this background it is no wonder, as Mr Keidel notes, that Beijing has instructed local statistical bureaus not to use the word “inflation” to describe the recent high price rises. Officials at the state statistics bureau say they have received no “formal instructions” along these lines but add that it is understood they should talk about prices rising “too fast”, or being “too hot”, rather than use the I-word.

But if the official figure went over 10 per cent, they admit, they would have no choice but to describe the phenomenon by its real name.

[用户系统信息]Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; (R1 1.3))
最后编辑2007-09-29 18:59:49.577000000
分享到:
gototop
 

猪肉是个大问题

 
作者:英国《金融时报》马利德(Richard McGregor)
2007年9月29日 星期六
 
 
在任何其它一个国家,人们可能会把猪肉短缺当作一种暂时现象而不予理会,随着价格上涨导致猪肉产量提高,在这种周而复始的“猪循环”(hog cycle)中,另一轮周期的到来便可解决这一问题。

但在中国,猪肉短缺(以及人们所担心的其对经济其它部分的影响)被当作一种近似于国家紧急状态的事情来看待。猪肉是中国人食用的主要肉类,同时食品占家庭预算的比重很大,

对通货膨胀的担忧,助长更广泛的不满情绪,这触及了中国统治者对于大规模动荡和政权存亡问题最切身的恐惧。20年前,通货膨胀最终导致了1989年天安门广场示威游行。最近数周,一些报道称,在安徽和广东,一些愤怒的学生抗议食堂菜价上涨和菜量减少。即便在北京、上海等富裕城市中心,食品价格上涨也在招致不满。

肉价推动通胀

中国8月份通胀率达到6.5%,为11年来的最高点,这在很大程度上归因于肉类和家禽价格较上年同期飙升49%(见图)。非食品价格涨幅仍保持在不到1%的较低水平,但这一事实并未缓解高层决策者的紧张情绪。

“我们已进入发展历程中一个非常微妙的阶段,”一位要求不透露姓名的资深经济学家兼政府顾问表示,“长期以来,我对中国的发展持非常乐观的态度,但现在我相当担忧。实际通胀率要高得多。没人相信政府的数据。”

通货膨胀已降低了银行储蓄的吸引力,一年期存款利率仅为3.87%。如果实际利率为负的情况持续下去,决策者担心储户有可能把钱抽离银行,将更多资金投入已经出现泡沫的股市和房地产市场。这位经济学家表示:“通货膨胀和资产泡沫现在互为支持。这非常危险。”

在中国政府的日程表中,两个重大事件加大了政府的压力。五年一度的中国共**第十七次全国代表大会将于10月中旬召开,选举2012年前的中国领导集体,而且有可能选定此后执政的新一代领导班子。同时,北京奥运会将于2008年8月开幕,中国政府将国家声誉押注于这次盛会。

调动猪肉战略储备

就目前而言,中国政府还一直在匆忙施行一系列措施,并于近日冻结了国家控制的价格,并从一个“猪肉战略储备”中调拨猪肉,同时鼓励农户养殖更多生猪并将其投放市场。官员们预计,国庆假日期间,需求会出现飙升,国庆节于10月1日开始,为期一周,是家庭聚会和宴请的时机。

华盛顿卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)的盖保德(Albert Keidel)给逐渐展开的危机描绘出一幅严峻的前景,他表示“抑制通胀的严酷措施可能导致困难和社会动荡”。盖保德曾是世界银行(World Bank)驻中国经济学家。如果在奥运会期间出现抗议事件,“(对抗议)残酷的报复可能将充斥世界媒体”,并严重损害中国的声望。他补充称:“后果将不仅损害经济发展,还有可能伤及中国与美国的商业和政治关系。”

猪肉短缺是多种因素交织在一起的结果。去年年底,猪“蓝耳病”席卷了许多农场,导致数百万生猪死亡。随着用于酒精生产的玉米需求上升,推高了全球玉米价格,饲料成本也随之上涨。此外,2006年猪肉价格较低,也促使农户减少了生猪养殖量。

猪肉短缺是暂时现象?

一些人认为,今年这种猪肉短缺的结果,的确是一种暂时现象,并表示市场正在解决这个问题。里昂证券(CLSA)驻上海的安迪•罗斯曼(Andy Rothman)表示:“由于物价上涨,蓝耳病仍在控制之中,农户今年年初开始重建他们的生猪库存。由于生猪从开始养殖到屠宰大约需要4个月的时间,这意味着供应应该在9月份开始赶上需求水平。”批发猪肉价格目前连续6周出现下滑,已从最高点下降11%。

如果这种趋势继续下去,通胀水平也将降低,从而在很大程度上缓解中国政府目前面临的压力。但如果情况相反,整个世界对中国通胀的担忧将会加剧,随之带来工资和出口价格大幅上涨的风险。进而,这可能意味着沃尔玛(Wal-Mart)和家乐福(Carrefour)美欧门店里的玩具、服装及一系列日常用品价格的上涨。这将对许多发达国家造成影响——过去10年来,一定程度上由于廉价的中国商品如潮水般涌入,这些发达国家的通胀水平一直较低。

但许多人怀疑,是否那么快就能解决“猪循环”周期。“这不是短暂或暂时的现象,而是一种转变,”泰臣食品公司(Tyson Foods)驻上海的中国区主管詹姆斯•赖斯(James Rice)表示。“(在这个行业)如果你希望扩大自己的产能,需要很长时间。”

担心已长成的猪患上蓝耳病、并急切希望卖个好价钱的农民们,还在提前屠宰生猪,这意味着每只生猪的出肉量正在下降。赖斯表示,通常在120公斤时才被宰杀的生猪,目前在75公斤左右就被宰杀了。

鼓励农民养猪

为应对该问题,中国中央和地方政府采取了一系列措施,鼓励农民养更多的猪,甚至下调运猪卡车的过路费。为达到宣传效果,中国政府上周动用其所谓的“猪肉中央储备”(也称为“猪肉战略储备”),向市场投放了相当于3万吨的活猪。

负责此事的两个部委表示,这种“猪肉储备”由活猪和冷冻猪肉两部分组成,但其规模属于国家机密。赖斯质疑,除美化政府处理该危机的可信度以外,该措施是否会产生任何实际效果。“他们对这种储备的描述,好像他们有猪埋在地下,就像石井里的石油一样,”他表示。“这并不是真正的储备。”

中国每天的猪肉消费量约为13万吨,因此无论怎么看,3万吨储备所能产生的影响将非常有限。来自农民的坊间证据也表明,重建猪肉库存不会那么快。

李永强(音译)已经在北京郊区养猪19年。他表示,猪肉价格大幅波动令小型养猪场场主更为谨慎。由于蓝耳病,李永强饲养的4000头猪损失近半,但他表示,为弥补这些损失而购进的母猪价格颇高,使这成为一笔风险很高的投资。“这些猪从新买饲养到屠宰,我要用一年左右的时间,而多数农户不知道到时候价格会怎样,”他表示。“养猪就好像炒股。如果价格高,你卖出;但如果价格低,你就被套牢了。”

为阻止猪肉涨价,政府迅速做出反应,或许甚至有些反应过度,这已对更广泛的经济政策产生了影响。中国央行今年已5次上调利率,试图控制物价。近来,中国政府已冻结了所有国家控制的价格,包括汽油价格和电价,旨在避免食品涨价的影响。

对经济政策的影响

上述两项举措都可能损及经济政策的关键领域。经济学家表示,目前中国央行本已在努力应对每月约250亿美元贸易顺差对货币政策的影响,而加息将为资本流入提供额外的刺激。

中国对人民币实施严格的管制,也是造成通胀压力的因素之一。中国央行购买因贸易顺差流入的资金(阻止人民币不断升值的必要措施),正增加国内的流动性,并推助房地产和股票价格膨胀。

与此同时,冻结汽油价格和电价与中国政府的能源政策背道而驰。外界一直推测政府会逐步上调价格,以迫使人们降低消费量、提高使用效率。不过,如果中国领导人看到由于汽油突然提价,缅甸9月爆发了街头抗议活动,他们无疑会再次下定决心,进一步推迟实施外界期待已久的改革。

食品涨价的结构问题

盖保德表示,无论如何,此类补救措施没有解决中国食品涨价的结构性问题。他表示,中国曾在1988年至1989年,以及1993年至1996年发生通胀危机,其根源在于中国长期的“食品安全”政策和进口限制举措。与日本一样,中国认为,国家安全有赖于它是否能够养活自己。

为遵循这一政策,只要出现供应下降和城市食品价格上涨,中国政府就出台激励政策,将那些希望退出低利润粮食生产活动的农民们,实际上又推回到粮食生产上。“当前中国愈演愈烈的通胀风暴,并非由贸易顺差或外汇储备增加等国际因素造成,”他表示。“这是中国国内的一场风暴,风暴中心是种植粮食的中部地区。”

但尽管名义上中国仍在实施食品安全政策,但实际上,强劲的国内食品需求,以及政府左右农民的能力不断下降,正使这一政策逐渐瓦解。例如,摩根大通(JPMorgan)的分析师表示,在1999年至2005年期间,中国的水果产量从6400万吨增至1.61亿吨,而同期用于粮食生产的土地比例则从72%降至67%。

中国共**不会忘记,他们能够于1949年上台执政,很大程度上得益于严重的通胀灾难,这场灾难摧毁了其对手国民党的可信度。中国共**在上台后的头几年里,致力于驯服通胀这头猛兽。

正如盖保德所言,在这种背景下,难怪中国政府会指示地方统计机构,不要使用“通胀”字眼来描述近来价格的大幅上涨。国家统计局官员表示,他们没有收到任何这方面的“正式指示”,但他们补充称,据他们理解,在谈及涨价问题时应该使用“过快”或“过热”,而不要使用“通胀”字眼。

但他们承认,如果官方通胀数据升至10%以上,他们就别无选择,只能采用其真正的名称了。
gototop
 
1   1  /  1  页   跳转
页面顶部
Powered by Discuz!NT